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ABSTRACT 
 
This study explores the performance of Malaysian financial institutions and identifies the 
effectiveness of Shariah Supervisory Board (SSB) as a corporate governance mechanism. 
Despite the importance of the subject matter, little research has been carried out on the 
influence of Shariah Supervisory Board as a corporate governance mechanism on firm 
performance in Malaysia. 
 
The conceptual framework describes how firms’ performance is influenced by the presence 
and absence of SSB. In the framework, the corporate governance variables are Board size, 
number of non-executive directors, number of women directors, number of committees, 
number of board meetings, company age, SSB size, SSB women directors and qualification 
of the SSB directors. The dependent variable of firm performance is assessed by measuring 
financial performance ROA (Return on assets) and market value (Tobin’s Q). This study 
primarily employs the agency theory to investigate the relationship between corporate 
governance and firm performance. It has been argued that board of directors; ownership 
concentration and managerial ownership are efficient corporate governance mechanisms for 
solving the agency problems between shareholders and management. 
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The study used the quantitative research method in which secondary data, comprising of the 
annual reports of the selected Malaysian financial institutions, was used to extract data. This 
study’s sample of financial institutions’’ was selected based on the DataStream database 
while data, related to governance-specific variables such as board-size, non-executive 
directors, women-directors, Shariah supervisory board-size and number of committees, was 
collected by hand, using the annual reports of each financial institution. To obtain 
quantitative measures of descriptive statistics, pair wise correlation and OLS (ordinary least 
square) STATA was used as a methodological tool to analyse the data. 
 
The findings of this study revealed that good corporate governance practices have positive 
effects on firm performance. This study also finds that SSB characteristics have less influence 
on the Malaysian firm performance, so when it works in association with other board of 
directors, it results in better firm performance. This suggests a complimentary role of SSB. 
 
Keywords: Corporate Governance, Shariah Supervisory Board, Financial Institutions, 
Malaysia, Board Size, SSB Size, Firm Size, Firm Performance 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 Background 
 
Corporate governance relates to control, mechanisms strategies, distribution and 
accountability of power by which firms ensures balanced relationships among shareholders, 
related stakeholders and other interest groups. Since the past financial scandals, corporate 
governance has become an issue in developing economies and this has created demands for 
better corporate governance practices (Baydoun et al., 2013). Because of the significance of 
corporate governance in the business world, it has become a broadly discussed issue in all 
developed and developing countries. The general point of view of corporate governance 
among investors and organisations is that it influences and determines the performance of the 
firm to protect the interests of shareholders (Garcia-Torea et al., 2016). Thus, corporate 
governance has become an evolving topic around the world. 
 
Several scholars and authors have studied the effect of corporate governance mechanisms on 
firm performance and they have found different outcomes from the studies. Some of the 
authors have found positive correlations between corporate governance and firm performance 
(Kiel and Nicholson, 2003; Haniffa and Hudaib, 2006; Jackling and Johl, 2009). To enhance 
the investment environment, improve firm performance, encourage economic development 
and establish investor rights, the practice of good corporate governance is required. It has also 
gained widespread fame in the stock-market economy (Adiloglu and Vuran, 2012). Most 
empirical studies have documented a positive relationship between corporate governance and 
corporate governance mechanisms, even though establishing the relationship between these 
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two was complicated (Bhagat and Bolton, 2008). Other studies have cited that corporate 
governance has less influence on firm performance (Hutchinson and Gul, 2003; Mashayekhi 
and Bazaz, 2008).  
  
It has been widely studied by researchers that corporate governance plays a significant role in 
improving firm performance. For example, Chhaochharia and Grinstein (2007), Dey (2008) 
and Mishra and Mohanty (2014) have highlighted that a firm performance can be 
significantly influenced by its corporate governance rules and practices. However, little is 
known about the effect of SSB as a governance mechanism on firm performance of financial 
institutions in Malaysia. Therefore, the current study fills the gap to understand whether SSB 
is integrated or segmented with regular boards and if it affects firm performance. 
 
Therefore, the current study aids the understanding of corporate governance practices with 
and without SSB and the impact of these practices on firm performance. 
 
1.2 Motivation of the Study      
 
This study is motivated by several considerations. Firstly, despite the importance of SSB 
being present in Islamic financial institutions, it has been found from the sample of this study 
that there are still some Islamic firms that have no in-house SSB. It has encouraged me to re-
examine the reason behind the absence of SSB in those firms and  also to find out if the SSB 
or other factors are affecting the performance of the firms. Secondly, the variations in the 
type of sample firms, markets, and sample periods used in prior studies motivate this study to 
further examine the relationship between governance mechanisms and firm performance.  
12 
 
1.3 Research Objectives and Research Questions 
 
The aim of this study is to explore the extent of SSB as a corporate governance mechanism 
by analysing the implementation and practices of SSB in Malaysian financial institutions 
through the opinions and perceptions of participants and available documents. There are a 
number of objectives through which the purpose of the study will be achieved, which are as 
follows: 
 
1. To investigate the extent of corporate governance effect on the performance of 
Malaysian financial institutions’.  
2. To identify the similarities and differences between the performance of firms’ with 
SSB and firms’ without SSB within the scope and framework of this study. 
3. To examine the reason for not having SSB in Islamic financial institutions even 
though it is a requirement. 
 
This study seeks to answer the following research questions: 
 
1. Is there a relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and the 
performance of Malaysian financial institutions’? 
2. Is there any similarity and difference between the performances of firms’ with SSB 
and firms’ without SSB? 
3. Is there any reason behind the absence of SSB in Islamic financial institutions despite 
the requirement?  
13 
 
1.4 Significance of the Study 
 
The Malaysian setting is particularly interesting for a number of reasons, firstly this study 
might help to get a better understanding of corporate governance in terms of agency theory in 
Malaysian financial institutions and if there are any possible improvements needed to deal 
with it. Secondly, the findings of this study may benefit many other countries with similar 
cultural, political, economic and environmental situation. In addition, it will also help to 
benefit the researchers, regulators, academics, investors and decision makers and will also 
assist the policy makers to make better governance standards.  
 
1.5 Research Scope and Limitation 
 
The study focuses on the publicly listed financial institutions in Malaysia. The period of the 
study is 2012 - 2016 following the Malaysian Corporate Governance Code 2012 as the 
fundamental framework. Relevant data on financial information is collected from annual 
reports of the firms, Datastream and Malaysian financial market websites. Quantitative 
analysis is employed in the data analysis to examine the relationship between firms’ 
performance and corporate governance variables. 
Nevertheless, this study has some limitations. Unlisted companies are not included due to 
lack of information. The main source of data for this study is mostly from the annual reports 
and it is a requirement for this study to have complete data for each year. Therefore, 
survivorship bias is an inherent limitation of this study.                                                                                                  
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1.6 Dissertation Structure 
The thesis comprises six chapters, commencing with Chapter 1 which introduces the topic 
and provides the background to the study as well as identifying gaps in the literature. 
Chapter 2 provides the literature review part 1 on corporate governance practices and firm 
performance. Chapter 3 explains literature review part 2 on the Shariah Supervisory Board in 
Financial Institutions. 
Chapter 4 explains the methodology of the study and includes the research hypotheses, the 
discussion of the variables used in the model for corporate governance and firm performance. 
It includes the data collection methods, measurement used and the conceptualisation and 
operationalisation of the hypothesis. The testing procedures employed to analyse the data 
used for the study are explained. 
Chapter 5 discusses the results of the statistical analysis of the data. The descriptive statistics 
compare the corporate governance variables and the performance of Malaysian financial 
institutions’. Correlation is used to measure the strength of association and an analysis of 
variance tests the hypothesis of the study and explains the interaction between the corporate 
and firm performance variables. In addition, the importance of individual governance 
variables in affecting firm performance variables is also discussed. This chapter further 
provides empirical evidence to accept or reject the hypothesis of the study. 
Chapter 6 presents the summary and conclusion of the study. In particular, it provides an 
overview of the analysis of the relationship between corporate governance practices and firm 
performance. It also discusses the limitations and suggestions for future research directions. 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 1: Corporate Governance and Firm Performance 
 
2.0 Introduction 
 
Corporate governance is a modern management approach that has been at the forefront of 
discussions of the financial services in companies for decades. The dramatic rise of 
globalisation has brought changes in the structure of strategy, administration and 
management of a business and has left firms under pressure to expand in the international 
markets (Musteen et al., 2009). The importance of corporate governance continues to gain 
widespread prominence in the capital market and it has attracted the attention of the public as 
well as national and international firms with the effect of globalisation, firms valuation 
criteria and investors decision (Adiloglu et al., 2012). Corporate governance issues have 
caught the attention of most scholars and have been touched upon in many studies because of 
all these reasons. 
 
2.1 Definition of Corporate Governance  
 
The term corporate governance has recently become more popular from different 
perspectives such as regulators, professional bodies and academics. Furthermore, due to the 
rising concern of corporate fraud and fraudulent financial reporting, corporate governance 
became popular in both developed and developing economies. There is a considerable 
argument among researchers and scholars about the corporate governance definitions. With 
regard to the various definitions, researchers and scholars in either narrow or broad sense 
classify corporate governance definitions. The narrow perspective is based on satisfying the 
shareholders’ interests.  However, in a broad perspective, it is the extension of previous 
16 
 
definitions and is based on satisfying the interest of the stakeholders (i.e. employees, 
government, customers and suppliers) (Letza et al., 2004; Sternberg, 2004; Gillan, 2006). 
 
The definition fundamentally relates to the epistemological assumptions involved (Gillan, 
2006). Corporate governance, for instance, can be perceived from the viewpoint of the 
shareholders. From the perspective of the organisation, this is the main motivation to 
maximise value of control mechanisms to main business operations (Zingales, 1997). 
Corporate Governance deals with the ways in which suppliers of finance to corporations 
assure themselves of getting a return on their investment as stated by (Shleifer and Vishny, 
1997). In case of corporate operations, it is normally not possible for principals in a modern 
public firm to be charged with responsibility, for this reason they entrust agents to supervise 
operations in their interests. As a result, due to the necessity of counteracting agency 
problems, corporate governance issues occur (Hart, 1995), and fundamentally from 
shareholders' attempts to protect themselves from the expropriation of their wealth as claimed 
by Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). 
 
This broad explanation is based on the organizational context, which is way more general. In 
other words, the broad definition does not provide the required theoretical frameworks that 
can be established on the basis of testable hypotheses or relationships. Whereas agency 
theory is an extensively used framework to conceptualise the relationship between firm 
performance and organizational structure, which was stated by Denis and McConnell (2003) 
in terms of being an appearance of property rights in corporate governance by principals; any 
understanding of firm structure must be started with the provision that shareholders are the 
primes (i.e. owners) in the organization.  
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Nevertheless, the agency theory is employed by this study as the main theory to examine the 
relationship between corporate governance and firm performance. The interests of the 
shareholders with relation to the agency problem and the underlying target of value 
maximization are contracted by the agency theory. On the most primitive level, decreased 
agency problems contribute to escalating the share value and consequence of this positive 
performance. This slight conceptualisation prioritizes the interests of the shareholders, whose 
overarching interest is value maximization. As a result, the narrow explanation is more 
appropriate while it offers the direct connection between corporate governance and financial 
performance with a view to the objective of the thesis to analyse the impact of corporate 
governance on firm performance. In cooperation with the narrow definition of corporate 
governance and the agency theory portray theoretical justification for the association between 
corporate governance and firm performance and therefore allow the testable hypotheses on 
the different corporate governance mechanisms in terms of progressed financial performance. 
 
2.2 Importance of Corporate Governance 
 
The significance of corporate governance has escalated internationally in the last decades 
hence mobilisation of capital, trade liberalisation, arising financial markets, technological 
progression and financial crises.  Corporate governance regarded as prime subject matter in 
the boardrooms of companies, amongst legislators and academics, and also considers it as an 
essential framework for companies by Claessens et al. (2000). Corporate governance 
becomes a vital assessment tool for investment choices as studies by Black (2001), Black et 
al. (2006), Selvaggi and Upton (2008) strongly support positive correlation between 
corporate governance behaviour and firms’ performance. Similarly, when investors are in the 
decision making process, firstly they look at the implications of corporate governance and its 
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compliance first, with the advices and regulations. Therefore, corporate governance is an 
important element in the decision making of investment.  
 
The principles of corporate governance are important and the degree of implementation of 
these principles and codes are critical to an effective corporate governance mechanism. These 
principles are not only to increase and protect shareholders’ value but also to ensure an 
elimination of conflict of interest, the interests of all stakeholders are considered and 
enforcement of transparency and accountability function properly in the interests of not only 
shareholders but also other stakeholders.  
 
According to Thorne et al. (2011), corporate governance focuses on the strategic-level of 
accountability and control leading to effective performance of all types of organisations. It is 
a balanced system that focuses on many corporate constituencies and perspectives such as 
proper resource allocation, delegation of power, decision-making authority and responsibility 
in accordance with strategic directions. 
 
In the perspective of financial institutions, Clasessens (2003) considers that corporate 
governance plays an important role in determining firms’ performance in respect of lowering 
cost of capital, ability to facilitate access to external finance, mitigate operational risk, 
improve performance and build a better relationship amongst the stakeholders. In this regard, 
a clear and detailed framework of corporate governance will stimulate the efficiency of 
financial institutions’ resolving agency problems, avoiding unnecessary agency cost and 
leading towards better firm performance (Hart, 1995). Corporate governance requires 
financial organisations to be more transparent and ensure equality not only to shareholders 
but also other stakeholders. Grais and Pellegrini (2006), state that more accountability and 
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greater transparency as components of good corporate governance practice will positively 
affect the growth of firms’ improving their stability and trustworthiness. 
 
The role of corporate governance is vital in helping firms achieve their specific objectives 
and goals. For financial institutions, the distinct function of corporate governance is mainly 
concentrated on the set of legal rules, determination of firms’ policies, the board of directors, 
the managers and their behaviours towards shareholders, depositors and other stakeholders. 
The complication of financial firms with a larger group of stakeholders affects the corporate 
governance framework. These factors also lead to the distinctive guidelines and codes to 
promote best practice of corporate governance in financial institutions. 
 
2.3 Theories related to Corporate Governance 
 
The following sections discuss theories and perspectives relevant to this study, which focuses 
on the relationship between corporate governance and the performance of Malaysian 
financial institutions’ and explain corporate governance mechanisms in terms of each theory. 
The following chapter presents a more comprehensive review of theoretical and empirical 
literature in order to explain how every corporate governance mechanisms might affect the 
firm’s performance. 
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2.3.1 Agency Theory 
 
Several corporate governance studies are originated from or guided by agency theory. In the 
opinion of, Berle and Means (1932); Eisenhardt (1989) and Donaldson et al. (1991) agency 
theory in case of corporate governance is obligatory with the intention of ensuring that the 
principal-agent risks and problems are alleviated. An agent is claimed to be such a person 
who accomplishes all the required responsibilities to perform certain work in support of other 
individual (the principal). Constitutionally, agency theory observes the relationships that exist 
between the individuals (managers) and the way they are contracted to work for the interests 
of the owners (principals) and also about the conflict of interests arises. Daily et. al (2003) 
remonstrated that humans are not eager to surrender their personal interests for the 
superlative interests of others. Therefore, each individual in an administration is encouraged 
to raise his/her own interests which are suggested by agency theory. According to, Clarke, 
(2004), the severance between management as the control and shareholders as owners is a 
common exercise in case of corporate structure, as a response to the nature of the modern 
corporations, which have a scattered ownership structure. 
  
Corporate governance is an apparatus by which the board of directors would supervise and 
reduce the disagreement of interest and the managers-owners’ problems as in the opinion of 
Berle and Means (1932). Jensen and Meckling (1976) referred the firm as a connection of 
contracts between individual factors in the disclosure of the agency theory. The firm is a split 
legal entity and not an individual, where divergences of interests and objectives of individuals 
live. In order to bring such conflicting issues into equilibrium, they are always supervised by 
contractual arrangements. On the authority of Jensen & Meckling, (1976), in respect to 
contractual arrangements and relationships are appeared into between and among many 
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businesses recounted parties that comprises shareholders, managers, customers, suppliers, 
creditors and employers. However, these corresponding contracts are eloquent in order to 
retain and defend the right of each individual engaged and to maximize the value of their 
organizations. In addition to this, in case of achieving this minimising agency costs and 
executing accounting methods to most proficiently imitate their own performances are two 
methods as obliged by (Deegan, 2006). 
 
Agency theory proposes a set of assumptions for governing corporations that normally 
encompasses of a great number of shareholders. Moreover, in order to organize and manage 
their investments for the reason of producing future profit and consequently enhance their 
wealth, these shareholders allot to managers responsibility. Although, these managers may 
not always have possession of shares in the corporation, but may possess an elevated level of 
understanding and occurrences in managing the corporation in the best possible manner as 
declared by (Aintablian and Boustany, 2008). In spite to minimise such conflict of interests 
between managers and shareholders is to align the interests of both the principal and the 
agent in one direction suggested by the resolution of the theory. As a matter of fact, corporate 
governance is fundamentally about concern of misuse of shareholders' resources by their 
managers (Clarke, 2004). Thus, Ang et al. (2000) stated that, as a result of misalignment of 
interest between the owner and the agent, agency costs occur. 
 
Correspondingly, Jensen and Meckling (1976) claimed that, agency cost comprises three 
components: monitoring, bonding and residual loss. Monitoring cost is the cost acquired by 
the principal to diminish the uncertain behaviour of the agent. In the same way, bonding cost 
is referred as the cost incurred to certify that managers’ decisions are taken for the interest 
and benefits of the principals. Lastly, the cost incurred when both the monitoring and bonding 
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costs have failed to control the assumed opposing and divergent behaviour of managers is 
stated as residual loss. In support of these effects on the agency cost and internal 
inefficiencies, agency theory recommends that corporate governance machinery are the tool 
to make sure that their investments are protected and their values are increased by monitoring 
and controlling manners and decisions of managers (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). On the 
authority of, by using agency theory Turnbull (1997) terminated that, shareholder value 
cannot be enlarged; all because of managers and executives get pleasure from the discretion 
which eventually permits them to side track shareholder values for their own personal 
benefits.  
 
On the whole, agency theory advocates facts about human behaviour applied to the behaviour 
of managers and executives and guides not only investors, similarly incorporate regulatory 
bodies through frameworks developed by its assumptions. Although, by using the 
assumptions of agency theory, analysis in addition to the structure of corporate management 
can be sensibly shaped and articulated for the profit of shareholders, corporate entities and 
the business environment primarily by allocating investment security. 
 
2.3.2 Stewardship Theory  
 
Contrary to agency theory, which focuses on managerial opportunistic individualism, 
stewardship theory suggests that executive managers are intrinsically trustworthy individuals. 
Stewardship theory prioritizes on psychological and sociological methods of 
misunderstanding, more willingly than the economic (pecuniary) tools of agency theory. In 
accordance with Davis et al. (1997) the former holds that organisational members encompass 
certain form of positive collective personality that eventually provokes trustworthy 
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behaviour. Muth and Donaldson (1998) concur in that financial gain is not essentially the sole 
driver of managerial behaviour and additionally managers require some discretion to manage 
the business for shareholders. Subsequently, separate ownership is not observed as a 
weakness in stewardship theory as cooperative behaviours are meant to be the intrinsic 
behaviour of managers stated by Donaldson and Davis (1991); Davis et al. (1997) and they 
are the subject matter to an array of motives as well as to financial gain proposed by (Muth 
and Donaldson, 1998).  
 
Stewardship theory conceives that apprehension for their own reputations and career 
progression restrains agents from acting in opposition to the interests of shareholders, 
therefore agency costs must be inherently minimised (Donaldson and Davis, 1994). On the 
authority of Clarke (2004), the involvement to firm performance of stewards associates with 
the context regarding socio-cultural and psychological factors. Managers are considered to 
execute better with greater empowerment and job approval which is a psychological aspect. 
Socially, managers (along with most personnel in a successful organisation) normally self-
identify as organisational representatives and since then they take under account the power 
accorded them by principals to be a tool for facilitating the organisation and other member of 
staffs to accomplish the organisational purposes. In case of situational perspective, it is 
predicted that managers work optimally in an environment that is participation-oriented (i.e. 
areas in which completion of tasks, control and thoughts are merged in a single procedure). 
Nevertheless, this will obviously have implications on the long-term relationship and loyalty 
that managers have towards the firm if the organisational culture has a collective orientation 
(Clarke, 2004).  
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Stewardship theory holds that an insider-dominated board is more effectual because it 
possesses more in-depth knowledge of organisational operations like, access to data and 
technical expertise (Muth and Donaldson, 1998). In addition to this, CEO-Chairman duality 
will make leadership and management more constant, particularly on the subject of decision 
making and strategy (e.g. investment), which is also supposed to contribute to greater success 
(Donaldson and Davis, 1991). Because the inside directors have more widespread and deep 
knowledge of daily operations within firms, their decisions are better enlightened. As said by 
stewardship theory, they are hence preferable to NEDs, because of their more exact 
knowledge of firm performance. However, with fewer inside directors, boards have decreased 
insight into the company's situation and advancement, providing them dependent on 
information embellished by the management along with little or no contextual knowledge in 
order to make any decisions self-regulating of the recommendations of managers, NEDs 
undergo from this similar lack of knowledge as the board in general. On the whole, reduced 
aptitude to oversee the managers and the making of less informed decisions by boards 
incorporating outsiders signifies that such boards are improbable in order to progress firm 
performance to the same extent as boards with a huge number of insider directors as believed 
by stewardship theory. 
 
2.4 Corporate Governance in the Financial Institutions    
 
Good corporate governance practice is crucial for financial institutions. The misconduct and 
corporate failure of several financial institutions have occurred, because of weak corporate 
governance framework (Schachler et al., 2007). There are different significant issues of 
corporate governance that affect the governance structure in the financial institutions such as 
heavily regulated and impeded common governance mechanisms, government ownership and 
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the ambiguousness of financial institutions that adjust the corporate governance equation 
(Caprio and Levine, 2002).  
 
The government or regulatory authority normally imposes certain regulatory requirements on 
banks, such as rules on deposit insurance, limitation on certain activities and restriction on 
shareholders. In addition to this, there are some important governance variables in the 
financial sectors, mainly in terms of board composition, size, ownership, board activity and 
CEO compensation. These exceptional characteristics imply the need for effective corporate 
governance measures for the financial firms. This is also supported by Macey and O’Hara 
(2003) in their study on corporate governance as they focused on the need for additional 
measures of corporate governance for financial institutions. 
 
In order to have safe and sound governance practices, the Basel committee on Banking 
Supervision (BCBS) has taken the initiative to provide guidelines on improving corporate 
governance system for firms because of the unique characteristics of corporate governance in 
financial institutions. Unlike the general principles of corporate governance by OECD, which 
are applicable to all types of corporate entity, the corporate governance standards provided by 
BCBS are more specific and exclusive to the financial institutions. 
 
The above studies and research on corporate governance suggest that multiple approaches to 
the model of corporate governance are crucial within the context of financial institutions. The 
diversity in the financial institutions compared to other corporate entities comes mainly from 
the presence of different stakeholders, such as shareholders, regulators, depositors and 
investors (Yamak and Suer, 2005). This circumstance states that board of directors and 
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managers are assumed to have duty towards all stakeholders and it needs a unique corporate 
governance system as a mechanism to control the firms. Yamak and Suer (2005) identified 
the major stakeholders in financial institutions and classified them into the owners, the 
regulators, the depositors, the borrowers, and the managers. The owners and the shareholders 
expect to maximise the firms’ profit, the regulators shows interest in the compliance to laws 
and regulations by all the stakeholders; the depositors assume return on their deposits; the 
borrowers are concerned with fair and non-discriminatory treat by the organisations and; the 
managers assume that they obtain financial and non-financial compensations. Identifying the 
rights and interests of all the stakeholders’, the corporate governance model in the context of 
financial institutions seem to be more complex than in any other types of organisations and 
shows for the practice of a specific model to practice. 
 
2.5 Good Corporate Governance Practice and Firm Performance 
 
Corporate governance has become a considerable issue worldwide and an essential ingredient 
for the stability of firms and long-term economy. It is important for the growth of the 
country’s economy. Therefore different markets and countries have used the basic and 
common OECD principles and guidelines to bring about the good codes of corporate 
governance practice. God governance practice stands for ‘little expropriation of corporate 
resources by controlling shareholders or by managers, which contributes to better allocation 
of corporate resources and firm performance.  
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Renders et al. (2010) found a positive correlation between good corporate governance and 
firm’s financial performance. On the other hand, a study by Gupta et al. (2013) was not able 
to confirm a positive correlation. Based on the findings of previous empirical studies on the 
relationship between corporate governance and firm performance, it can be said that the 
empirical studies along with the theory does not define exactly what good corporate 
governance is. Instead, prior studies have explored several characteristics of good corporate 
governance such as board size, independence of the board, frequency of meeting, board 
compensation and other variables. Therefore, for instance Castaner and Kavadis (2013) 
explored clearly ‘good’ corporate governance using a collection of governance variables 
rather than defining the term. The same goes for different codes of corporate governance in 
different countries. OECD (2015) mentioned that each country has its own model of 
corporate governance, which consists of country-specific cultures, history and circumstances. 
 
2.6 Corporate Governance and Firm Performance in Malaysia 
 
In accordance with Haniffa and Hudaib, (2006), the importance of possessing good corporate 
governance had not received much concentration in Malaysia. Particular corporate 
disintegrates occurred, for instance Berhad, Renong Berhad, and KFC Holding Berhad, due 
to the deficient of effective corporate governance mechanisms before the Asian financial 
crisis in 1997 and 1998. As can be seen, this designates that in Malaysia poor corporate 
governance donated to the financial crisis. In the same manner, the crisis in Malaysia has 
provided adjoined momentum in order to corporate governance reforms. However, in 2000, 
the Malaysian government has instituted the Malaysian Code of Corporate Governance 
(MCCG) as foremost initiative, which identifies a framework for best practices in case of 
corporate governance. Moreover, the Malaysian corporate has experienced advancement on a 
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episodic basis. As has been noted, the Malaysian government casted corporate governance 
codes as Malaysian Code of Corporate Governance (MCCG, 2000, 2007 and 2012). As a 
result, intensive efforts with the intention of reforming corporate practices in sponsoring 
corporate governance in Malaysia has been made by the high-level Malaysian finance 
committee. 
 
In compliance with Hamza, (2013), in Malaysia the Sharia governance framework is based 
on the centralised model as contacted to the decentralized being practiced in the GCC 
countries. Therefore, on the basis that the Central Bank itself has its own Shariah supervisory 
board called the Shariah Advisory Board and all Islamic financial institutions are required to 
form their own Shariah committee that must comply with the rules set by the Shariah 
Advisory Board of the Central Bank, the centralised model is formed. In obedience to the 
comparative studies conducted by Mollah and Zaman (2015) between conventional and 
Islamic banks on the correlation between Shariah administration, corporate governance and 
performance, the final results indicate that supervision boards are positively impact on 
Islamic banks performance because of their roles in case of shielding the shareholder concern 
and acquiescence towards Shariah principles. Additionally, Maurya, et al. (2015) designates 
that there exists a very well-built and positive connection among the size of board of directors 
and numeral of associates of the Shariah Committee towards banks performance.  
 
On the contrary, Garas (2012) argues that the number of Shariah Committee members 
insignificantly concludes their power over the financing and investing activities of Islamic 
banks. On the contrary, it has been disagreed that elevated number of Shariah committee 
constituents escorts to disputes that resulting in inadequacy in decision making process. On 
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the authority of Wan Abdullah, et al. (2013) found that, there appears insignificant 
association among the size of Shariah board and the coverage of Shariah disclosures in the 
annual reports of Islamic banks in Malaysia.  
 
2.7 Association between Corporate Governance Variables and Firm Performance 
 
This section will describe the association between the governance variables and firm 
performance which will help to build up the hypotheses for this study. 
 
2.7.1 Board Size and Firm Performance 
 
Board size refers to the total number of directors on the board of directors that are on the 
firm’s board. There are several evidences of empirical studies conducted on the influence of 
board size on firm performance (Dalziel and Hillman, 2003 and Fuzi, et al. 2016). There is 
argument on the effect of the size of the board on firm performance that it may not just vary 
by firm level characteristics but also by country-specific factors, such as; legal practices, 
institutions and governance mechanisms (Karamanou and Vafeas, 2005). Ntim et al. (2015) 
suggest in the empirical studies that country-specific factors, such as governance 
mechanisms, legal framework, culture, religious and ownership structure affect the 
composition of the board and, as a result, they affect board monitoring function and firm 
performance. 
 
Latif et al. (2013) monitored the effect of corporate governance mechanisms on firm 
performance and they also figure out a noteworthy positive affiliation among board size and 
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firm performance. Therefore, their final outputs support Zahra and Pearce’s (1989) 
termination about the authority of board size on firm performance. As a consequence, 
previous studies those were conducted by John and Senbet (1998), Dalton et al. (1999), 
Haniffa and Hudaib (2006), Yawson (2006), Lehn et al. (2009) established that large boards 
endow with wider multiplicity of backgrounds, diversity in communications skills, 
experiences and business contacts outside the company.  
 
Similarly, Dalton et al. (1998) claimed that larger boards consent to the directors to swap 
over more highly skilled counsels and represents additional scope for the opportunity of 
correspondence with different exterior linkages. Moreover, by performing their strategic 
function more effectively, which is essential during periods of financial turbulence to reduce 
agency problems and these problems are controlled by the larger boards (Mintzberg, 1983). 
Surprisingly, the deficiency of diversity in smaller boards arises uncertainty concerning 
strategic development under such circumstances as stated by (Pearce and Zahra, 1992) and 
(Goodsteing et al. in 1994). On the whole, this eventually enlarges the agency problem and 
undermines performance in firms with smaller boards. 
 
On the contrary, Chaghadari (2011) justified the significance of one of the corporate 
governance means which is, board size of companies listed on Bursa Malaysia and functional 
linear multiple regression as the fundamental statistical test. Moreover, the study did not 
discover a noteworthy association among board size and firm performance in the sample of 
selected listed companies in Malaysia. On the other hand, further study accomplished by 
Kajola (2008) was absolutely about the alliance between the corporate governance 
mechanisms and firm performance of a sample of 20 Nigerian listed firms did not locate a 
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considerable connection involving the board size and firm performance of the listed 
companies in the Nigerian Stock Exchange.  
 
Consequently, the Malaysian Code and the KLSE Listing Requirement were soundless about 
the number of directors that should appear on board. However, it was suggested that the 
board size should not be too big nor too small but satisfactory enough so that to allow for 
active and effectual involvement and they should be able to execute their duties in point of 
fact. Additionally, few companies may not pursue these instructions and commendations. 
Since not all the companies have the same size and the same style of work. Thus, the size 
might differ from company to another company. 
 
Nonetheless, in accordance to Sharma (1985) small board size is easily influenced by senior 
managers. On the whole, it can be argued that when board size is large, the capability of the 
board to organize managers become effective in controlling agency problem and improving 
firm performance. In the conclusion, agency theory predict that the size of the board illustrate 
the level of control by the management team. Therefore, this study conjectures that board size 
is related to firm performance.  
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2.7.2 Board Committees and Firm Performance 
Several past evidences have considered the number of board committees as a vital 
measurement for firm performance. Board of directors have fiduciary duties of acting on 
behalf of the shareholders (Fama and Jensen, 1983).  In practice, the board delegates most of 
the duties to board committees (Adams, 2003; Guo and Masulis, 2015). Some of these 
committees are made ad-hoc for a particular task, whereas standing committees are delegated 
with specific, narrowly defined tasks. Important board decisions are initiated in these 
committees and evidence shows that the delegation of duties to committees facilitates 
effective corporate governance (Billmoria and Piderit, 1994; Adams, 2003). The references of 
these committees are placed before the full board for discussion (Klein, 1998). According to 
S&P 500 (Standard & Poor's 500) sample, all firms have minimum one standing committee, 
with the average firms having three committees. Most common committees among these are 
audit committee, nomination committee and remuneration committee. 
 
Concurring with the agency model, the Cadbury Report (1992) argued that board committees 
are an additional control mechanism to encourage increased accountability and optimum 
financial management of firms, with increased protection of shareholder interests (Cadbury, 
1992). Harrison (1987) argues that shareholder protection and generally responsible 
behaviour can be induced in corporate boards due to the successful application of board 
committees. The specialist functions of board committees thus promote the credibility, 
legitimacy and accountability of corporate governance. The practical implications of board 
committees are reflected in the fact that a significant proliferation in their use has occurred 
since the early 1980s (Harrison, 1987), and most corporate governance codes advocate such 
33 
 
committees (Cadbury Report, 1992), mainly related to functions concerning nomination, 
remuneration and auditing committees. 
 
Shivdasani and Yarmack (1999) found that if the CEO is on the nomination committee, then 
firms appoint few independent directors. Guo and Masulis (2015) states that firms with full of 
independent nomination committees have higher sensitivity of forced CEO turnover, and 
nomination committee independence is significant even when firms have independent boards. 
In contrast, Anderson and Bizjak (2003) find that independence of compensation committee 
and the presence of CEO does not affect executive compensation. Committee independence 
also affects the timing of earnings announcement (Michaely, et al. 2014). 
 
2.7.3 Board Meetings and Firm Performance 
 
According to the requirement of Malaysian Code on corporate governance, companies are 
encouraged to have regular board meetings for discharging duties and responsibilities. Also, 
it is mandatory for the board to disclose the number of board meetings held in a year and 
details of the attendance of each individual director in respect to meetings held. Frequency of 
board meetings is considered to be an important way of improving the effectiveness of the 
board (Conger and Lawler, 2009; Adam and Ferreira, 2009). It is argued that board meetings 
and attendance of the meetings are considered to be important channels through which 
directors obtain firm specific information and able to fulfil their monitoring role. A study 
conducted by Francis et al. (2012) indicated that firms with poor board attendance at 
meetings perform significantly worse than boards which has good attendance during financial 
crisis. In addition, Ntim and Osei (2011) conducted a study in South Africa which also 
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suggested similar findings between the frequency of board meetings and corporate 
performance where boards that meet more frequently tend to generate higher financial 
performance. 
 
On the other hand, there are researchers who consider board meetings not necessarily useful 
due to the limited time non-executives spend with the company and consider such time could 
be better utilised for a more meaningful exchange of ideas with the management (Vafeas, 
1999). The effectiveness of the corporate board is highly based on the frequency of their 
meetings (Lipton & Lorsch, 1992). It is believed that the frequency of board meetings affect 
corporate performance (Jensen, 1993; Vefeas, 1999). Ntim and Osei (2011) stated that a 
statistically significant and positive association exists between the frequency of corporation 
board meetings and corporate performance, implying that South African board that meet 
more frequently tend to generate higher financial performance. The study provided an 
empirical support for agency theory, which suggests that corporate board that meet more 
frequently have increased capacity to effectively advice, monitor and discipline management, 
and thereby improving corporate financial performance. 
 
2.7.4 Proportion of Non-Executive Directors and Firm Performance 
 
The board comprises of executives and non-executives who are either independent or non-
independent directors. The non-executive directors (NEDs) need to play a role in monitoring 
the actions of the CEO and executive directors to ensure that the shareholders’ interests are 
well cared for and to add to the diversity of skills and expertise of the directors (Weir and 
Laing, 2001) and (Abdullah, 2004). The Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance (2000) 
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and the revised code (2007) recommend that it is the best practice to have a balance 
membership board of directors where independent NEDs should make up at least one third of 
the board membership. This is to ensure the effectiveness of the independent directors in 
maintaining good decision making for the company. In Pakistan, Awan et al. (2012) 
discovered a positive relationship between NEDs and firm performance measured using 
return on asset (ROA) and return on equity (ROE). Another study that was conducted among 
Belgian companies found a significant relationship between the number of outside directors 
and ROE which supports the notion that outsiders are able to perform a monitoring function 
as a result of their independence and the interest of the shareholders are well protected 
(Dehane et al, 2001).  
 
Despite the advantages of having more NEDs on the board, prior studies have shown contrary 
result from the analyses of the relationship between the NEDs and firm performance. 
According to Weir & Liang (2001) non-executive directors are only employed on a part-time 
basis and are therefore likely to have other work commitments, they may lack the expertise 
necessary for understanding highly technical business issues and may have insufficient 
information when required to make key decisions. A study conducted by Abdullah (2004) in 
Malaysia used data from the (KLSE) Main Board for the period between 1994 and 1996 
found that there is no significant difference in performance between firms with independent 
boards and firm with non-independent boards. Similar findings are reported by Rahman and 
Mohamed Ali (2006) non-executive directors had no influence on firm performance. This 
could be due to in many developing countries including Malaysia the selection of the 
independent directors is not based on their expertise and experience but more for political 
reasons to legitimate business activities and contracts (Haniffa & Hudaib, 2006).  
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In contrast, a study conducted by Salleh et al. (2005) found that a higher percentage of non-
executives has created better auditing systems and improved financial reporting timeliness 
(Abdullah, 2006). Abidin et al. (2009) found evidence that a higher proportion of independent 
non-executive directors on the board have a positive impact on firm performance based on 
value added intellectual coefficient measurement. This study addresses and investigates the 
conflicting issue of whether a high proportion of outsider directors have an impact on the 
firm performance of an organisation. 
 
2.7.5 Women Directors and Firm Performance  
 
A growing number of studies in recent years have explored the influence of board diversity 
on the firm outcomes (Terjensen et al. 2009) and particularly the gender diversity is measured 
by the presence of women directors on the board (Hillman, 2015; Post and Byron, 2015). 
Existing academic research not only indicates that less women on the boards relative to their 
presence in the population but also shows that gender diversity on the board able to increase 
benefits to the organisational outcomes (Burgess and Tharenou, 2002; Simpson et al., 2010; 
Terjensen, 2015). 
 
Firstly, a gender diverse boardroom is argued to be associated with better quality decisions 
than the male only boardroom (Milliken and Martins, 1996).  Male and female directors often 
differ in their backgrounds, core values, perspectives and risk attitudes (Simpson et al., 2010; 
Adams and Funk, 2012). As a result, gender diversity on board may bring down benefits to 
the firms’ through their experiences, skills, knowledge, information and networks (Hillman et 
al., 2007). Previous studies indicate that in comparable to male directors, most women 
37 
 
directors are likely to have managerial and public relation skills rather than marketing and 
operating functions (Zelechowski and Bilimoria, 2004). They are more likely to have non-
business backgrounds and hold more advanced degrees (Hillman et al. 2002), which assist the 
firms to achieve competitive advantage and handle more effectively with their product 
diversity and labour markets (Bilimoria and Wheeler, 2004).  
 
In accordance with the ‘value in diversity’ previous studies also suggest that women directors 
have diverse point of view which promotes the boardroom discussions (Letendre, 2004) and 
transparency (Upadhyay and Zeng, 2014). Many studies have empirically examined the 
relation between women directors on the board and firm performance (Ahern and Dittman, 
2012; Matsa and Miller, 2013; Goergen and Renneboog, 2014). Recent studies on 
microfinance institutions noted that more number of women on the board is able to lower the 
operating costs (Chakrabarty and Bass, 2014) and influence the firm performance (Storm et 
al., 2014).  
 
On the contrary, several papers have found no relationship or negative relationship between 
the percentage of women directors on board and firm performance. For instance, Smith et al. 
(2006) found a negative relationship between gender diversity and gross profit to sales. 
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2.7.6 Firm Size and Firm Performance    
 
Shaheen and Malik (2012) referred to firm size as the measure and array of production 
capability and potential a firm possesses or the diversity and quantity of services that a firm 
concurrently make available to its customers. Firm size plays an important and effective role 
in explaining the kind of relationship it has within and outside environment it is operating. 
Babalola (2013) argued that large firms outperform small firms, so the larger a firm is, the 
more it influences its stakeholders. The model of economies of scale theoretically supports 
the positive correlation between firm size and profitability and this justification was 
noticeable in studies conducted by Babalola (2013), Kumar and Kaur (2016) and Kartikasari 
and Merianti (2016). However, the outcomes of these studies have been controversial and 
inconsistent, whereas, some academics and scholars found positive relationship while others 
found negative relationship. 
 
2.8 Summary 
This chapter critically analyses the assumptions and arguments of corporate governance 
theories and its application to modern companies. This chapter also discussed the 
mechanisms of governance and their effect on financial performance. In addition, it presents 
the relationship between governance variables and firm performance. The review of literature 
will help to build up the hypotheses which determine the relationship between corporate 
governance and firm performance. 
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Chapter 3: Literature Review 2:  Impact of Shariah Supervisory Board (SSB) on 
Malaysian Financial Institutions’ Performance 
 
3.0 Introduction 
 
This chapter discusses the SSB, their role in financial institutions and how it influences the 
firm performance. The SSB is one of the most important governance mechanisms of an IFI to 
ensure compliance with Shariah which is a distinctive characteristic of an IFI as compared to 
its conventional counterpart. Acknowledging this important characteristic, the Accounting 
and Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial Institution (AAOIFI) has issued a set of 
standards on SSB, Shariah review and internal Shariah review; all collectively known as 
governance Standards (AAIOIFI, 1999). Besides these standards, Malaysia and several other 
countries have also passed laws to govern the formation and function of SSB. This chapter 
reviews relevant literature that examines SSB practices and the extent of their impact 
particularly on the Malaysian financial institutions. 
 
3.1 Shariah Supervisory Board (SSB) 
 
Shariah board (SB) is considered as an essential key participant in the governance of Islamic 
companies found in Islamic organizations. Therefore, it is a part of the governance 
framework of Islamic business (El-Ghayad, 2008). Several researchers have characterized the 
board. Garas and Pierce (2010) provide that “the SB is a group of Islamic scholars, appointed 
by the shareholders and similar to the board.” Thus, Accounting and Auditing Organization 
for Islamic Financial Institutions (AAOIFI) governance standards put SB on par with the 
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board of directors. Similarly, the Islamic Financial Services Board-10 (IFSB-10) defines the 
Sharia Supervisory Board (SSB) as a body made of a panel of Shariah scholars that provide 
Shariah expertise and act as an advisor to the institutions.  The member of SSB is responsible 
for the follow-up the tasks and the validity of the implemented transactions in the IB and to 
find legitimate solutions to the irregularities. The SSBs also responsible for following up, 
examining, analysing activities, business, behaviours, and operations that carried out by the 
several Islamic Financial Institutions (IFIs), to ensure that they are in accordance with the 
rules and principles of Shariah. Choudhury and Hoque (2006) state that SSB or a Shariah 
advisor guide Islamic financial institutions as a legitimate control body. 
 
According to the SSB Functions, the purpose of the SSB is to ensure that the financial 
institutions operate in conformity with Shariah and are usually made up of a number of jurists 
who provide clarification in regards to any questions that the financial institutions may have 
(Rammal, 2006). The financial institutions appoint the SSBs to act as an internal control body 
in the firms, therefore increase the credibility in the eyes of customers (Algaoud and Lewis, 
1997). 
 
Malaysia is one of the leading countries and backbone of the Islamic financial industry in the 
world (IFN, 2015). It involves the Shariah Advisory Council (SAC) as a Council for Fatwa, 
which mainly follows the Central Bank of Malaysia. This Council was established in 1997 to 
provide the highest Shariah authority for Islamic finance in Malaysia. SAC has the authority 
of certainty of Islamic law for the purposes of Takaful business, financial business, Islamic 
financial business, Islamic banking business or any other business that is based on Shariah 
principles and regulated by Bank Negara Malaysia (BNM, 2016). 
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3.2 Role of SSB in Financial Institutions 
 
Role of Shariah board depends on the degree, nature and extent of Shariah compliance and it 
also varies from one to another board. Inspired by its shareholder value orientation and its 
foundational dimension, the Shariah board has fiduciary duties to all its stakeholders. Besar et 
al. (2009) states that the role of SSB is to emphasize on the matter relating to Shariah 
compliance and generally do not participate directly in the risk management process as 
evidenced from the annual reports of firms that they do not appear in the risk management 
committee. The opinion of the Shariah supervisory board members on Shariah related matters 
are placed to the board of directors to take the final decision. Thus, it is important to know 
whom SSB is liable to and how far its existence is truly relevant. 
 
A study conducted by Hasan (2011) indicates that SSB is accountable to the board of 
directors in many respects, since their appointment, dismissal and remuneration depends on 
the approval of the board of directors. However, SSB is one of the stakeholders of the 
financial institution, so the nature of their decision making may influence the approval of a 
product over another; their decisions are debated on the level of board of directors as well as 
internal auditing level. Therefore, their decision matters to the increase or decrease of the 
volume of business. The main role of the SSB in the financial institutions is summarized in 
the participation to formulate the instructions, regulations, forms of contracts, correction and 
development. They are also responsible for supervising the activities of the firms to ensure 
the conformity of its works to Islamic legal precepts and principles (Gulzar, 2006). 
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3.3 Shariah Governance Process  
 
Literature documents several characteristic of SSB such as appointing the board members, 
composition of the board, qualification of SSB members, expertise may have an impact on 
the efficiency of SSB (Farook et al., 2011; Rahman and Bukair, 2013). This section will 
describe the SSB governance process which might influence firm performance. 
 
3.3.1 Appointment  
 
In existing practice, the Board of directors or the shareholders appoint the members of the 
Shariah board in the annual general meeting (AGM). The document of International 
Association of Islamic banks (IAIB) mentions that, in order to ensure independence and 
freedom, a Shariah board members must not be a staff from the bank is not subject to the 
authority (Rammal, 2006).  Furthermore, the AAOIFI governance standard states that the 
shareholders have the right to appoint Shariah board members during the annual general 
meeting. The Shariah board members are allowed to place their decisions on the board 
meetings and discuss religious issues (Nathan and Ribiere, 2007).  
 
3.3.2 Educational Qualification 
 
A well-educated member in the board positively deals with the new challenges and improves 
the quality of the board (Kakabadse et al., 2010). Therefore, there is a positive relation 
between the qualified Shariah Board members and firm performance (Cheng et al., 2010). 
The educational background always has been a major factor in the discloser practice (Farook 
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et al., 2011). In respect of SSB, the more qualified Shariah board members the more profit for 
the business (Musibah and Alfattani, 2014). It is expected to be better versed in finance and 
banking sector if the board member have a doctorate degree (Farook et al., 2011; Rahman 
and Bukair, 2013; Nomran et al., 2018). Nonetheless, there are Shariah scholars even without 
any academic degree or qualification or in Shariah related studies (Bakar, 2016). 
 
3.3.3 Board Composition 
 
A Shariah board usually comprises of Shariah scholars who are experts in usul al fiqh and 
fiqh al muamalat. The composition of the board members varies from one institution to 
another. The Shariah board normally consist of regional scholars, whereas in individual 
Islamic financial institutions are comprised of local scholars. The IFI appoint three to six 
members on the Shariah board. The AAOIFI Shariah board is comprised of not more than 
twenty people and they are among the Shariah scholars. Malaysia is one of the countries that 
follow the AAOIFI standard requirement for standard composition of Shariah board. 
 
3.3.4 Expertise 
 
Shariah board members are scholars in Islamic commercial jurisprudence with expertise in 
the field of Islamic financial institutions (IFI) comparing to the board of directors (AAOIFI, 
2005; Al-Qattan and Abdul Sattar, 2007) which make them able to fulfil their accountabilities 
in supervising the financial reporting. Similarly, the study conducted by El-Chaarani (2017) 
shows that the existence of Shariah supervisory board members with certain types of 
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expertise affects the level of discloser because of their awareness of the importance of 
transparent reporting. 
 
The Shariah scholars’ shortage of knowledge causes governance practices to face challenges. 
Some of them have the lacking of knowledge on Shariah based law and misinterpret the rules 
(Chowdhury and Sarker, 2015). 
 
3.4 Shariah Supervisory Board (SSB) and Firm Performance 
 
According to Choudhury and Hoque (2006) Islamic corporate governance is a faith based 
theoretical framework that is regarded as a theory that relates to the process of decision-
making using the principles of the Islamic socio-scientific epistemology of Tawheed, oneness 
of God. The influence of the Islamic view of corporate governance is significant, particularly 
when related to transaction cost minimization in decision-making environments and 
achievement of the objectives of the corporation within the framework of Sharia law and 
Islamic rules and principles (Choudhury & Hoque 2006). 
 
The main distinguishing attribute of Islamic corporate governance is the mandatory presence 
of a Sharia Supervisory Board (SSB) as all business transactions have to be Sharia compliant 
(Alman 2012). Bukhari et al. (2013) study found that board of directors and Shariah 
Supervisory Board are the most significant dimensions that influence corporate governance. 
Alman (2012) observed that the increasing size of SSB influence the loan portfolio risk-
taking of Islamic financial institutions. Quttainah et al. (2013) suggest that small SSB size 
may reduce the agency costs and may increase the coordination between the board members. 
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Similarly, Yarmack (1996) states that smaller size of the BOD facilitates the communication 
among the board members thus make the decision making process more effective.  
As for the Shariah supervisory board, small size board is more manageable and easier to 
monitor comparing to the large size SSB. Another argument supported large size SSB as it 
may comprise of various skilled and experienced scholars and schools of fiqh which may lead 
to a better understanding of the products and thus eventually better performance (Hamza, 
2016).   
 
3.5 Prior Studies on Shariah-Based Corporate Governance 
 
The modern Islamic finance industry has been growing rapidly and strong practice of Shariah 
laws are needed to support this growth. To illustrate, Abdullah et al. (2012) presented the 
correlation between different governance structures of Islamic and conventional banks. 
Chapra and Ahmed (2002) showed that when any infringement of Shariah laws occurs, most 
of the depositors in IFIs would withdraw their money.  In addition, they also found that the 
growth of Islamic finance industry is emerging swiftly in South East Asia and Middle Eastern 
countries.  
 
But on the contrary, high capital ownership and family business are conspicuous features of 
this market. Surprisingly, the consequence of these markets is the security of minority 
shareholders and investment account holders (IAHs) for IFIs are very fragile (Darmadi, 
2013).  Garas (2012) examined the incompatibility between Shariah Committee and board of 
directors and other third parties and found that the major reason behind the confliction in the 
Shariah Committee is the executive position which is held by Shariah Committee members. 
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Grassa and Matoussi (2014) investigated the governance structure of Islamic banks in Gulf 
Cooperation Council and Southeast Asian countries including the governance practices and 
found the limitations of the current governance framework for Islamic banks which require 
further development and enhancement.         
 
3.6 Summary 
 
This chapter aims to provide SSB characteristics and whether they play an important role in 
financial institutions. It has also critically analysed the literature from the prior studies based 
on Shariah based corporate governance and the monitoring system. 
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Chapter 4: Research Methodology 
 
4.0 Introduction 
 
This study investigates the performance of Malaysian financial institutions and understands 
whether SSB as a governance mechanism influence the firm performance. This chapter 
presents the research philosophy and explains the methodology that was applied in 
undertaking the research and it also justifies the use of quantitative research methods in 
analysing the variables and testing the hypotheses. 
 
This chapter is structured as follows. Section 4.1 covers the research paradigm, which is 
primarily a positivist approach. Section 4.2 considers and evaluates the research methodology 
to achieve the objectives of the study; it thus focuses on the quantitative methods mainly 
through the use of regression and secondary data gathered from different sources. Section 4.3 
includes the proposed hypotheses. Section 4.4 introduces the dependent and independent 
variables, control variables as well as the performance measure variables. Section 4.5 
discusses the sample selection and justification of the sampling period. The final section 
presents the testing procedure which is the regression analysis, and the use of STATA in 
running the analysis. 
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4.1 Research Paradigm and Philosophy 
 
Burrell and Morgan (1979) argue that researchers must select the proper paradigm for their 
study. Henn et al. (2006) states, paradigms can generally be classified either as positivist or 
interpretive paradigms. This study takes the positivist paradigm in which the hypotheses are 
developed based on the idea of the impact of the corporate governance on the Malaysian firm 
performance that can be investigated and empirically examined using the researcher‘s tools of 
analysis and the theoretical conjectures. The study uses deductive reasoning and quantitative 
techniques because the positivist approach seeks causes or facts and effects of social 
phenomena (Hussey and Hussey, 1997). Bryman and Bell (2007) indicate that the deductive 
approach is related to quantitative research that follows objectivism, ontological realism and 
epistemological positivism. 
 
Saunders et al. (2009) affirmed that deduction is linked to positivism, and fulfills the need to 
describe the casual association between or among variables and the need to generalize a 
conclusion. Accordingly, the nature of this study implies implementing deductive rather than 
inductive approach for the following reasons (Saunders et al., 2009):  
 
 It is used to testing hypotheses rather than to building new theory.  
 It tends to be informed by scientific principles rather that gaining further understanding of 
human-constructed meanings related to events.  
 It identifies casual relationships amongst variables rather than clarifying the research 
context.  
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 It uses quantitative data.  
 It is a more structured approach than inductive approach.  
 
In summary, the research paradigm of this study is informed by the fact that the study does 
not seek to produce a new theory but to test existing hypotheses based on analysis of 
quantitative data, thus the deductive approach is more appropriate for this research. This in 
turn brings to the discussion of philosophical stance on whether the issue of SSB and 
financial institutions’ performance can be appropriately ascertained and understood. While 
this study attempts to provide some evidence of the relationship, by no means it suggests that 
the presented evidence is absolute. Attempts are made in ensuring the methodology is 
rigorous and this is discussed in the next section on research strategy, design and approach.      
 
4.2 Research Strategy, Design and Approach   
    
Research strategy helps researcher to investigate the research issues. According to Saunders 
et al. (2009), research strategy is a general plan, which helps to answer the research questions 
in a systematic way and also helpful to use specific data collection methods to support the 
arguments. 
 
This study uses a total of 50 financial institutions listed on the main board of the Bursa 
Malaysia and excluded 7 companies which do not have the required information. Secondary 
data used for the period of 2012 to 2016. The data collection method follows the technique 
adopted by previous studies (La Porta et al., 1998). Consistent with prior literature, the 
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dependent variable, which is the performance, is measured by return on assets (ROA) and 
Tobin’s Q (Musibah and Alfattani, 2014; Grassa and Matoussi, 2014; Mollah and Zaman, 
2015). Firm performance assed by ROA is the most common ratio to measure the 
performance. All the independent variables selected in this study were collected from the 
firms’ annual report giving information on corporate governance mechanisms such as board 
size, non-executive directors, board committees, board meeting and women directors. In this 
study, independent variable like proportion of women directors on SSB were selected to 
examine its impact on firm performance. 
 
In accounting studies, quantitative approaches have become more popular as a result of the 
increasing availability of electronic database sources such as DataStream, Bloomberg and 
Compustat and online annual reports which provide financial information and data. 
Researchers of quantitative studies are engaged with the prediction, manipulation, and testing 
of empirical variables, emphasising research design, procedure, and statistical measures of 
validity (Nachmias and Nachmias, 1996). 
 
In short, the current study will use one type of data collection method, which is quantitative 
data (DataStream and annual reports). An OLS regression model is the primary technique 
used to determine the variables’ influence on the relationship between corporate governance 
and firm performance. 
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4.3 Research Hypotheses 
 
This section discusses the following six hypotheses that are tested in this study. 
 
4.3.1 Board Size 
 
Several studies found that larger boards put more effort to compromise and negotiate among 
members, thus their decisions are more shaped and less likely to satisfy different opinions 
than those of smaller groups (Kogan and Wallach, 1965). Sah and Stiglitz (1991) compared 
the result of group decision-making and noticed that larger groups had a diversification of 
opinion effect which lowered the possibility of accepting bad projects. On the contrary, 
Lipton and Lorsch (1992) found evidence that smaller groups are more often result in better 
firm performance. Lipton and Lorsch (1992) also argued that larger board may have less 
efficiency because of difficulties in solving agency problems among members of the board. 
Cheng (2008) examined the effect of different board sizes on variability of corporate 
performance and found the empirical assumption that larger board make less extreme 
decision and thus have less variable performance. On the other hand, smaller boards are more 
likely to have extreme short wins and losses. Thus it is possible to assume that larger boards 
are much better at achieving a higher level of firms’ performance. 
H1. There is a positive relationship between board size and firm performance. 
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4.3.2 Non-executive Director 
 
According to the stewardship theory, NEDs are less capable of monitoring the mangers than 
inside directors because of their lack of specialist knowledge about firm’s internal operations. 
Bozec and Bozec (2007) argued that NEDs are commonly part-time workers who undermine 
their ability to monitor and because of less information, advise the board only on what they 
have. This lack of information also reduces their ability to apply their decision efficiently. As 
a result, high levels of NEDs dominate boards and result in low quality decisions while also 
negatively impacting on firm performance. Previous studies Harmalin and Weisbach (1991); 
Hart (1995) also argued that NEDs often have lack of knowledge about the company, they do 
not bring the requisite skills to the job and are too engaged to contribute effectively. This 
might reduce their monitoring function to observe the managers who might work for their 
own interests rather than the interests of shareholders’ and firm’. This will increase agency 
problem which leads to the negative impact on firm performance. 
H2. There is a negative relationship between NED and firm performance. 
 
 
4.3.3 Women Directors 
 
Terjensen et al. (2009) showed that three key theories suggest greater gender diversity may 
further contribute to better board performance and effectiveness: agency theory, resource 
dependency theory and gender role theory. From the perspective of agency theory, Francoeur 
et al. (2008) suggest that women often bring a fresh perspective on complex issues which can 
help correct informational biases in strategy formulation and problem solving. Virtanen 
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(2012) study reports that female board members are more likely to take active roles on the 
board compared to their male board members. 
 
There are other evidences of boards where more women have levels of public disclosure (Gul 
et al., 2011) and, better oversight of management reporting which enhances earnings quality 
(Srindhi et al, 2011). Female board members attend more board meetings and are more 
prepared for board meetings (Adams and Ferreira, 2009). As such, it is expected to see a 
positive relationship between women directors and firm performance. 
H3. There is a positive relationship between women director and firm performance. 
 
4.3.4 Board Committees 
 
Previous studies indicated that the number of committees in a board is also a significant 
measurement for firm performance. Boards are generally subdivided into smaller committees 
to observe the executive management efficiently and perform all other jobs which involves 
serious agency problems (McClogan, 2001). There are mainly three committees that support 
the board activities: audit, remuneration and nominations committees. These committees are 
comprised of expertise members who deal with specialised issues. McMullen (1996) found 
that firms that have audit committees face less financial distress. The study conducted by 
Klein (2002) mentioned that independent audit committees reduce the probability of earnings 
management which, in turn, increase transparency. On the contrary, Baxter (2010) found no 
relationship between firms’ financial reports and the presence of audit committees. Weir and 
Laing (2000) argued that the presence of a remuneration committee leads to benefits for the 
firms and result in better performance. Similarly, Abbott et al., (2004) found that existence of 
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audit committees reduce the mistakes and abnormalities on the board. From the above 
literature it can be assumed that there is a positive relationship between board committees and 
firm performance. 
H4. There is a positive relationship between Board committees and firm performance 
 
4.3.5 Board Meeting 
 
The intensity of a board’s activities is measured by the frequency of board meetings, and the 
quality or effectiveness of its monitoring (Vefeas 1999; Conger et al 1998). A higher 
frequency of board meetings leads to a higher quality of managerial monitoring, and therefore 
positively influences the financial performance (Vefeas 1999; Ntim 2009). Frequent meetings 
with informal side-line interactions can create and strengthen cohesive bonds among directors 
(Lipton and Lorsch 1992), and will positively influence on corporate performance. Mangena 
and Tauringana (2008) found a positive relationship between the frequency of board meetings 
and firm performance.  So it can be assumed that there is a positive relationship between 
frequency of board meetings and firm performance. 
H5. There is a positive relationship between Board meetings and firm performance. 
 
4.3.6 SSB Size 
 
If the SSB is small, agency costs may be reduced and the coordination between the boards 
members may be increased (Quttainah et al., 2013). A smaller size also helps to get better 
communication, thus decisions making can be more effective (Yermack, 1996). Jensen 
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(1993) argues that there should be at least seven or eight people in the board to ensure 
effective performance. For the SSB, smaller size SSB is much easier to manage and monitor, 
compared to larger size SSB. There is also an argument supporting large SSB, as it may 
comprise of scholars with multi experience and skills and schools of fiqh which may then 
lead to a better understanding of the products and operation ultimately resulting in better 
performance (Hamza, 2016). Few empirical evidences confirm significant impact of SSB size 
on financial institution performance like Matoussi and Grassa (2012), Mollah and Zaman 
(2015) and Nomran et al. (2018). Thus, this study hypothesizes that: 
H6. There is a positive relationship between SSB size and firm performance 
 
4.3.7 Firm Size   
 
Past studies have represented a positive impact of firm size on the financial performance 
(Black et al, 2006).  On the contrary, some other previous studies have shown negative 
relationship. Larger size firms need more monitoring (Nenova, 2003) which also results in 
extra cost for the firms. When the size of the firm gets larger, the efficiency level gets low 
and the management losses its control on strategic and operational decisions. Finally, it is 
argued that large size firms have the higher possibility of meeting agency problems which 
will result in negative impact on firm performance. 
H7. There is a negative relationship between firm size and firm performance. 
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4.4 Variables Definitions 
 
Different studies have used different measurements to investigate the firm performance. Most 
of the empirical studies tried to examine the firm performance by applying some financial 
measures such as Tobin’s Q (Yermack, 1996; Weir et al., 2002; Kiel and Nicholson, 2003), 
ROA (Yermack, 1996; Kiel and Nicholson, 2003), ROE (Bhagat and Black, 1999; Adjaoud 
et al., 2007), ROI (Adjaoud et al., 2007). 
 
In this study, corporate governance variables are independent variables and firm performance 
variables are dependent variables in the regression and the accounting based measure which 
is ROA is used because it is the most common ratio used to measure firm performance 
(Adewale and Rahmon, 2014) and higher ROA shows higher firm performance (Al-Matari et 
al., 2014 and Habbash & Bajaher, 2015). Accounting based measures use audited accounting 
data that confirm more consistent and clear view towards firms and as a result, the market 
does not misrepresent these measures. Because they are based on book values, these 
measures are less volatile and more consistent than market based indicators like stock returns, 
share prices, etc. (Lopez et al., 2007). As the final financial performance variable, Tobin’s Q 
which entails market value of equity is assigned to examine the firm performance from the 
market aspect. Further, it is believed that two measures are sufficient to a general picture of 
Malaysian financial institutions’ performance. Although Haniffa and Hudaib (2006) argue 
that there is no certain result that indicates which measure is the best to examine firms’ 
financial performance with. Hence, the ROA and Tobin’s Q are defined as follows: 
 ROA = 
EBITDA
Total Asset
 
 Tobin’s Q = Total Assets−Book Value of Equity+Market Value of Equity
Total Assets
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In turn, the independent variables are defined as follows: 
 
 Size (SIZE) = In (Total Assets)  
 Liquidity (LIQD) = 
Current Assets
Current Liabilities
  
 Leverage = Long-term Debt ( 
Long−term Debt
Book Value of Equity
)  
 Board Size (Board_Size) = Number of total board members 
 Non-Executive Director (NED) = Number of total non-executive members  
 Women Directors (Women-Dir) = Number of total women board members  
 Foreign Directors (Foreign_Dir) = Number of total foreign board members   
 Company Age (C_Age) = the number of years since the company was established 
 Board Committees = the number of board of directors’ committee. 
 Board Meetings = total number of meetings held annually.  
 SSB Size (SSB_Size) = the size of SSB 
 SSB Women members (SSB_Women) = the percentage of Women present in the 
Shariah Supervisory Board. 
 SSB Qualification (SSB_Quali)= if any member with formal qualification in Business 
studies (Such as Diploma, bachelor, Masters, PhD) 1= Yes and 0= No 
 SSB BOD (SSB_BOD) = Any SSB member sits on the board. 1= Yes and 0=No 
 
Besides the dependent and independent variables, control variables were used to measure the 
firms’ performance. There are different studies (Yermack, 1996 and Black et al., 2006) that 
have used different control variables to measure firm performance. In this study firm size and 
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firm age are used as control variables. This study used total assets as a proxy of firm size by 
using the natural logarithm of total assets. Firm size is used to measure its likely effect on 
financial performances of Malaysian firms. Firm age is calculated as each year minus 
establishment date of the company to determine how many years it had been incorporated 
before 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015 and 2016. 
 
 Firm size (Size) = In (Total Assets) 
 Firm Age (C_Age) = the number of years since the company was established. 
 
4.5 Data Sampling 
 
The objective of this study is to conduct an investigation of the corporate governance 
practices of Malaysian financial institutions and their impact on the performance of these 
institutions. The aim is to compare between the firms with SSB and firms without SSB. The 
sample size of the study consists of Malaysian financial institutions listed for 43 of 50 
companies. Banks and real estate investment trusts on the BNM and the MYX. However, the 
study sample was subject to the following criteria. 
 
First, the study covers the years 2012-2016. The rationale for using this as the study period is 
summarised in the following points: (a) this study uses the Malaysian Corporate Governance 
Code 2012 and previous research papers as a guide for corporate governance variables (b) in 
Malaysia, the development of a comprehensive Islamic finance ecosystem was guided by two 
roadmaps. First one Financial Sector Masterplan (2001-2010), to ensure the effective 
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functioning of Islamic finance in parallel with the conventional banking and insurance. The 
second roadmap, the Financial Sector Blueprint (2011-2020), Malaysia aims to position itself 
as the premier global Islamic finance marketplace. 
 
Ghauri and Gronhaug (2005) suggest that secondary data is an essential method and that there 
is no need to collect primary data if secondary data is available to answer the research 
questions. Therefore, this research used secondary data to measure corporate governance 
mechanisms and firm performance. Corporate governance mechanism variables and firm 
performance information were collected from Datastream, firms’ annual reports, Malaysian 
Securities Market and Malaysian Financial Market websites. Data and information required 
for the study comprised of board size, liquidity, leverage, number of NEDs, board 
committees, board meetings, women board of directors, foreign directors, SSB size, 
percentage of women on the SSB and SSB members’ qualifications. Performance data used 
in this study were ROA (Return on Assets) and Tobin’s Q. The data on firm age was 
collected form the annual reports. Firms, for which no annual report or required information 
was available, were excluded from the current study. 
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Table 1: Summary of Research Data Set 
Financial Institutions No of Firms 
Total financial institutions 
(18 Real Estate Investment 
Trusts)        and     (31 
Banks) 
 
50 
Minus: Institutions, which do 
not have required 
information 
(7) 
Financial institutions with 
full data set 
43 
 
4.6 Testing Procedures 
 
Data was analysed using Stata software to run data panels. This data panel regression uses the 
unbalanced panel data. Panel data analysis was not possible because of small sample size. 
This study employs OLS (Ordinary Least Square) with robust for heteroskedasticity.  
 
Governance influence on firm performance (ROA and Tobin’s Q) has been tested through 
linear regression models. To test the hypotheses, the following models are employed: 
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Full regression model: 
In order to examine the relationship between governance variables and firm performance, the 
following model is developed. 
Firm Performance = f (corporate governance variables, control variables) 
 
Model 1:   
 
Yit 
𝛼 + 𝛽1BODSIZEit + β2NEDit + β3WOMENDIRit + β4COMMITTEENOit +  
β5MEETINGNOit  + β6FIRMSIZEit + β7SSBSIZEit  +  
β8SSBWOMENit +  β9SSBQUALIit +  εit 
 
Model 2: 
 
Yit 
 𝛼 + 𝛽1BODSIZEit + β2NEDit + β3WOMENDIRit +  β4COMMITTEENOit +  
β5MEETINGNOit  +  β6FIRMSIZEit + β7SSBSIZEit  +  
β8SSBWOMENit + β9SSBQUALIit + εit 
 
Where, Yit is alternatively ROAit and Tobin’s Qit,  
BODSIZEit is the board size for ith firm at time t. 
NEDit is the non-executive director for ith firm at time t. 
WOMENDIRit is the number of women directors on the board for ith firm at time t. 
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FOREIGNDIRit is the number of foreign directors on the board for ith firm at time t. 
COMMITTEENOit is the number of board committees for ith firm at time t. 
MEETINGNOit is the number of board meetings for ith firm at time t. 
FIRMSIZEit is the firm size for ith firm at time t. 
SSBSIZEit is the SSB size for ith firm at time t. 
SSBWOMENit is the number of women in the SSB for ith firm at time t. 
SSBQUALIit is the qualification of SSB members for ith firm at time t. 
α is the intercept 
βi is the regression coefficient of ith variable and  
i,t is the composite error term 
The subscript i represents the different firms and t represents the different years. 
 
4.7 Summary 
 
In this chapter, the research paradigm is considered and the research method used is 
described. Sample selections and all the dependent and independent variables with the control 
variables are introduced, research hypotheses are presented and data analysis techniques with 
the testing procedures are explained. The next chapter will analyse the research findings and 
present the discussion of the results from quantitative data (Datastream and annual report 
data). 
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Chapter 5: Data Analysis, Results and Interpretations 
 
5.0 Introduction 
 
The previous chapter explained the data and specified the research design employed in this 
study. This section aims to explore the main inferences which were drawn from the model 
regression. Section 5.1 starts with Descriptive statistics, continues with univariate analysis 
and multivariate analysis for dependent, independent and control variables. Univariate 
analysis is the simplest form of quantitative analysis which describes the single variable in 
terms of applicable unit of analysis: statistical dispersion, frequency distribution and central 
tendency. On the other hand, multivariate analysis refers to any statistical technique used to 
analyse data that arises from more than one variable. Multivariate analysis is continued in 
section 5.2. Then next section 5.3 of this chapter would be the Discussion. 
 
The key purpose of this study is to find answers for seven research hypotheses which are: 
 
H1. There is a positive relationship between board size and firm performance. 
 
H2. There is a negative relationship between NED and firm performance. 
 
H3. There is a positive relationship between women director and firm performance. 
 
H4. There is a positive relationship between Board committees and firm performance 
 
H5. There is a positive relationship between Board meetings and firm performance 
 
H6. There is a positive relationship between SSB size and firm performance. 
 
H7. There is a negative relationship between firm size and firm performance. 
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In order to answer the research hypotheses, the study starts with the descriptive statistics to 
show mean, median, maximum and minimum, standard deviation, skewness and kurtosis 
values of variables to describe them separately. Then the ordinary least square was employed 
to establish if corporate governance indicators have an effect on company financial 
performance. 
 
5.1 Univariate Analysis 
 
The univariate analysis examines the predictive ability of independent variables one at a time.     
                               
5.1.1 Descriptive Statistics 
 
The analysis begins with examining the basic features of the data using descriptive statistics. 
Table 2 represents 5 years summary of mean, median, maximum values, minimum values, 
standard deviation, skewness, kurtosis of dependent and independent variables from 2012 to 
2016. The dataset of 213 observations from 43 companies during the time period of 5 years 
into the STATA, was recognised by the system as unbalanced data. This relates to the fact 
that all the financial institutions do not have complete data for all the years under observation. 
This study will start by comparing the performance of Malaysian financial institutions with 
SSB and without the SSB. 
 
Table 2 compares and describes the performance and the perspective of assets growth of 
Malaysian financial institutions both with SSB and without SSB as a governance mechanism. 
Firstly, Board size (Board_Size) in descriptive statistics has an average of 7.47 with a 
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minimum of 4 and a maximum of 13. Jensen (1983) and Lipton and Lorsh (1992) recommend 
that the board size has a maximum of 7 to 8 members, with the maximum number of 10 to be 
effective. Mean of sample companies’ board size support their suggestion with the number of 
7.47. But the maximum number of board size from the descriptive statistics is 13, so this 
seems much higher than their findings. Most prior studies that investigated the impact of 
board size on firm performance found either a negative or a positive relationship. Dalton et 
al. (1999); Hillman and Dalziel (2003) and; argue that larger boards are better than the small 
ones in improving firm performance. They argue that in small boards the powerful position of 
the CEO enable him to override the decisions made by the board members in accordance with 
their own interests leading to increase the agency problem and correspondingly undermining 
the performance of the firm (Miller, 2003). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
66 
 
 
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics for 2012-2016 
 
 
 
 Firms with SSB  Firms without SSB  
Variables Mean Min Max Std. 
Dev 
Mean Min  Max Std. 
Dev 
                                     Independent variables (Governance variables) 
Liquidity 1.5220 0.1275 9.0609 1.9288 1.6212 .0086 14.1824 2.0068 
Leverage 0.2360 0 0.5261 0.2129 0.2075 0 5.2506 0.4323 
Board Size 9.2 6 13 1.8901 7.4702 4 12 1.8178 
NED 7.6444 3 12 2.1758 5.625 1 11 1.9070 
Women Director 1.5111 0 5 1.2177 1.0952 0 3 0.7679 
Foreign Director 0.9111 0 4 1.4273 1.1845 0 6 1.5920 
Committee No 4.6 3 8 1.0090 2.9583 0 8 1.259 
Meeting No 11.8 4 25 4.7891 5.7559 2 21 3.0514 
SSB Size 5.5555 3 9 1.5308 0 0 0 0 
SSB Women 1.0444 0 3 0.8244 0 0 0 0 
SSB Qualification 0.6444 0 1 0.4840 0 0 0 0 
SSB BOD 0.0888 0 1 0.2877 0 0 0 0 
Control variables         
Firm Size 17.6421 14.225 20.4166 1.9682 14.6337 11.9134 19.7558 1.6985 
Firm Age 28.7777 6 56 16.1932 25.5 0 111 26.5232 
                                          Dependent variables (Performance variables) 
ROA (Return on Assets) 0.0240 -.0020 .0665 0.0153 0.1302 0 3.5462 0.3469 
Tobin’s Q 1.0468 0.8973 1.3445 .08969 1.0374 0.0199 3.1568 0.4536 
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The mean value of the proportion of non-executive directors of firms without SSB is 5.62 and 
a mean value of 7.64 for the firms with SSB as given in Table 2. The minimum number of 
non-executive directors is 1 and 3 whereas the maximum for the firms without SSB is 11 and 
for the firms with SSB is 12. This is consistent with some previous studies (Bhagat and 
Black, 1999; Yermack, 1996), which stated that higher percentages of NEDs in a firm are 
likely to experience poor performance because NEDs are not full-time workers, they are 
unfamiliar with business and operations and not able to comprehend the difficulties face by 
the firm. 
 
Women directors has an average of 1.09 with the minimum of 0 and maximum of 3 for the 
firms without SSB and when it is with SSB the average is 1.51 with a minimum of 0 and 
maximum of 5 in Table 2. So the average of women directors on the board increases when 
the firm has SSB.  The above table shows that there is a positive impact of women directors 
on the board. Different theoretical perspectives have positively supported the gender diversity 
in the boards. Erhardt et al. (2003) stated that agency theory is mainly concerned about 
monitoring the role of board of directors and emphasizing the representation from diverse 
groups will provide a balanced board so that no group of individuals or individual can 
dominate the decision making. On the other hand, a study conducted (Rose, 2007) shows 
insignificant association between proportions of women directors on the board and firm 
performance. However, it is now believed by many scholars that if there is an increase in 
gender diversity on the board then it may lead to better governance and allow the board to 
have broader talent pools (Bathula, 2008).  
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In Table 2, the average of board committees is 3 with the minimum of 0 and a maximum of 8 
for the firms without SSB and in firms with SSB the average is 4.6 with a minimum of 3 and 
maximum of 8. The appointment of remuneration, audit and nomination committees by the 
firms are complying with the code of best practice on corporate governance. 
Board meeting has the average of 5.7 with the minimum of 2 to maximum of 21 without 
SSB, while it has the average of 4.6 with minimum of 3 and maximum 8. 
The mean value of SSB size is 5.5 with the range of 3 to 9 in the firms with SSB. Mollah and 
Zaman (2015) found mean size of SSB (4.17), ranging from 1 to 14 for a sample of 86 
Islamic Banks across 25 countries.  Firm size has an average of 15.26 with a range of 11.91 
to 20.41. 
 
5.1.2 Correlation Analysis 
 
This analysis was used to test the study and understand the relationship among all the 
independent variables. Multicollinearity problem occurs when two or more independent 
variables are highly correlated with each other, which might have a negative impact on the 
regression (Hair et al, 2014). High correlation might make the regression unreliable. Table 3 
exhibits pairwise correlation, which describes the correlation of independent variables related 
to this study. 
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Table 3: Correlation Analysis 
Note: *, ** and *** indicate 10%, 5% and 1% level of significance, respectively 
 
ROA Tobin’s Q LIQD Leverage Size C_age Board_Size NED Women_Dir Foreign_Dir CommitteeNo MeetingNo SSB_Size SSB_Women SSB _Quali SSB _BOD
ROA 1
Tobin’s Q -0.2834*** 1
LIQD 0.0611 0.0088 1
Leverage -0.0574 0.1490 ** -0.0987 1
Size -0.2593*** 0.1344 -0.2197*** 0.1291 1
C_age -0.1223* 0.1088 0.0146 -0.0973 0.3013***
Board_Size -0.0869 0.2100*** -0.1296 0.1333 0.5871*** 0.1086 1
NED -0.0878 0.2301*** -0.0688 0.0457 0.5036*** 0.1245* 0.7434*** 1
Women_Dir -0.0365 0.0857 -0.1992*** -0.0329 0.3535*** 0.0357 0.3800*** 0.3317*** 1
Forein_Dir -0.1003 0.0729 -0.2141*** 0.1431** 0.1891*** -0.0387 0.4187*** 0.2567*** 0.088 1
CommitteeNo -0.0475 0.009 -0.0605 0.0412 0.3554*** 0.1617 0.1926*** 0.1854*** 0.2100*** -0.0837 1
MeetingNo -0.1327 0.1879*** -0.0876 -0.0316 0.7026*** 0.2846*** 0.3152*** 0.3825*** 0.1231* -0.1091 0.3621*** 1
SSB _Size -0.1370** 0.0039 -0.0322 0.0333 0.6128*** 0.0725 0.3673*** 0.3356*** 0.1822*** -0.0212 0.4746*** 0.6135*** 1
SSB _Women -0.11 0.01 -0.0995 -0.0179 0.4943*** 0.1161** 0.3244*** 0.3606*** 0.1704 0.0215 0.3458*** 0.5818*** 0.7770*** 1
SSB _Quali -0.112 0.0017 0.0139 -0.0671 0.4393*** 0.0519 0.1733 0.1644 0.1945*** -0.1027 0.3092*** 0.4953*** 0.8193*** 0.6898*** 1
SSB _BOD -0.0306 -0.0439 0.2679*** -0.0461 0.0197 0.0859 0.0116 0.0781 -0.1446** -0.1002 0.17 0.0639 0.2815*** 0.1290* 0.3485*** 1
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As shown above, board size has a positive relationship with SSB size (0.3673), firm size 
(0.5871) and firm age (0.1086), women director (0.3800), number of committees (0.1926), 
NED (0.7434). NED is positively correlated with board committees (0.1854), firm size 
(0.5036) and firm age (0.1245). Board committees are positively related with firm size 
(0.3554) and firm age (0.1617). Firm size has a positive association with firm age (0.3013), 
leverage has a positive association with firm size (0.12). 
 
The highest correlation is between SSB size and the qualification of SSB members. SSB size 
and female members in the SSB is the second highest correlation. Our results show that 
women director has a positive relationship with Tobin’s Q. 
 
5.2 Multivariate Analysis 
 
Multivariate analysis uses different variables to test the association between corporate 
governance variables and firm performance. The multiple regression models have been used 
in previous corporate governance and firm performance studies such as Vafeas (1999). 
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5.2.1 Ordinary Least Squares (ROA) 
Table No 4 
Variables Main Variables Main with Interactive 
Variables 
Interactive 
Variables only 
ROA Coef. Std. Err. Coef Std. Err. Coef Std. Err. 
LIQD .0003 .0105 .0011 .0105   
Leverage -.0164 .0188 -.0147 .0166   
Size -.0573** .0277 -.0563** .0272   
C-age .0007 .0003 -.0009** .0004   
Board_Size .0252 .0136 .0233* .0137   
NED -.0055 .0064 -.0064 .0072   
Women_Dir .0160 .0197 .0759 .0487   
Foreign_Dir -.0148 .0094 -.0182* .0108   
CommitteeNo .0077 .0092 .0419* .0252   
MeetingNo .0087** .0038 .0074** .0035   
SSB_Size .0018 .0093 -.0552** .0255   
SSB_Women -.0085 .0159 -.0044 .0165   
SSB_Quali -.0342 .0344 .0260 .0380   
SSB_BOD -.0486 .0420 -.0623 .0425   
Board_Size x 
SSB_Size 
  .0048** .0024 -.0017* .0005 
Women_Dir x 
CommitteeNo 
  -.0182* .0103 -.0003 .0029 
Note: *, ** and *** indicate 10%, 5% and 1% level of significance, respectively 
 
 
Table no 4 shows the regression results for ROA. The first column shows the coefficient of 
all independent variables that shows the magnitude and direction of relation between 
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independent variables and financial performance measure (ROA). The second column 
represents the standard errors and the third column shows the t-value, which states the 
significance of the regression outcomes. When it comes to the comments from the analysis, 
findings from OLS regression clearly indicates mixed results between independent variables 
and ROA.  
 
Liquidity, board size, women director, number of committees, number of board meetings and 
SSB size all have positive impact on the financial measurement (ROA). On the other hand, 
firm size, leverage, NED, firm age, SSB women, qualification of SSB members, and number 
of SSB members sit on the board shows negative association with the financial measurement 
(ROA). However only firm size, board size, firm age and number of board meetings have 
significant impact on ROA. More specifically, double-size firms will experience 
approximately 6% reduction in ROA while mature firms experience slightly higher ROA. 
Larger board size improves ROA performance by 3% and more frequent meetings also 
improve performance slightly. 
 
In this study two pairs of interactive variables have been tested to measure their influence of 
firm performance. The table shows that first interactive variable which is Board_Size × SSB_ 
Size has positive and significant effect on ROA. The second interactive variable which is 
Women_Dir × CommitteeNo shows negative but significant impact on ROA. These two 
results are particularly interesting as they demonstrate the joint effect of the governance 
factors in influencing the firm’s performance. A synergy between board and SSB members 
will slightly improve ROA performance while negative performance is observed for having 
more women directors in the committee.     
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5.2.2 Ordinary Least Squares (Tobin’s Q) 
Table No 5 
  
Note: *, ** and *** indicate 10%, 5% and 1% level of significance, respectively 
 
 
 
Variables Main Variables Main with Interactive 
Variables 
Interactive 
Variables only 
Tobin’s Q Coef. Std. Err. Coef Std. Err. Coef Std. Err. 
LIQD .0100 .0169 .0104 .0168   
Leverage .1858*** .0635 .1927*** .0646   
Size -.0373 .0338 -.0362 .0334   
C-age .0013 .0011 .0014 .0011   
Board_Size .02837 .0325 .0402 .0344   
NED .0293 .0185 .0228 .0188   
Women_Dir .0204 .0359 .0584 .0663   
Foreign_Dir .0113 .0118 .0106 .0127   
CommitteeNo -.0058 .0159 .0010 .0345   
MeetingNo .0333 .0134 .0325 .0135   
SSB_Size -.0350 .0148 .0650 .0571   
SSB_Women -.1025* .0592 -.0809 .0571   
SSB_Quali .1899** .0867 .0712 .0917   
SSB_BOD -.1586 .1048 -.1810* .1005   
Board_Size × SSB_Size   -.0098 .0050 -.0001 .0006 
Women_Dir × 
CommitteeNo 
  -.0078 .0140 .0033 .0050 
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5.2.2 Ordinary Least Squares (Tobin’s Q) 
 
Table no 5 shows the regression results for Tobin’s Q. It is found that board size, NED, 
women director, number of board meetings and liquidity all has positive impact on the firm’s 
market performance. On the other hand, firm size, SSB size, SSB women, number of SSB 
members sit on the board shows negative association with the firm’s market performance. 
Interestingly, it is found that the firm’s market performance is affected by a set of different 
factors as compared to the previously analysed ROA performance. Leverage, number of 
board meetings, SSB size, women SSB and qualification of the SSB members have 
significant impact on firm’s market performance. More specifically, 10% increase in leverage 
will improve firm’s market value by approximately 2% and more frequent meetings improves 
market value by 3%. Interestingly, larger SSB size and the presence of women in SSB reduce 
market performance by 4% and 10%, respectively. Market performance is observed to be 
increased by 19% for SBB with more qualifications. In terms of the effect of interactive 
factors on firm’s market performance, this study only found a slightly reducing market value 
performance causing by an interaction between the Board_Size and the SSB_Size.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
75 
 
The summary of the hypotheses results with regard to the relationship of governance and 
performance variables are given in Table 6  
 
Table 6: Summary of Hypotheses Results 
 
Financial 
Measurement 
Independent 
Variable 
Relationship 
Direction 
Significant 
Value 
Result on 
Hypothesis 
ROA Board_Size Positive 0.067* Reject H1 
Tobin’s Q Board_Size Positive 0.384 Accept H1 
ROA NED Negative 0.373 Accept H2 
Tobin’s Q NED Positive 0.115 Accept H2 
ROA Women_Dir Positive 0.384 Accept H3 
Tobin’s Q Women_Dir Positive 0.561 Accept H3 
ROA CommitteeNo Positive 0.872 Accept H4 
Tobin’s Q CommitteeNo Negative 0.716 Accept H4 
ROA MeetingNo Positive 0.023* Reject H5 
Tobin’s Q MeetingNo Positive 0.014* Reject H5 
ROA SSB_Size Positive 0.646 Accept H6 
Tobin’s Q SSB_Size Negative 0.019* Reject H6 
ROA Size Negative 0.040* Reject H7 
Tobin’s Q Size Negative 0.271 Accept H7 
*: Significant impact 
**: Statistically significant impact 
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5.3 Discussion 
 
This section deals with the main implications, which were drawn from the regression models. 
We are going to consider that the results are highly significant at 0.01, significant at 0.05 and 
marginally significant at 0.1, which applies to all of the following tables and results. 
 
Firstly, we found that when the board size increases, the ROA and Tobin’s Q also increases. 
Simon et al. (2014) and Mohamed (2009) found a positive relationship between board size 
and financial performance for Malaysian companies. The board size has significant effect on 
ROA but it has insignificant effect on Tobin’s Q.  However, there are some advantages of 
having larger boards. Dalton et al. (1999) suggested that larger boards offer high quality 
advice and counsel to the CEO. Furthermore, large board perform their strategic function 
more effectively, which is essential during periods of financial turbulence to reduce agency 
problems (Mintzberg, 1983). 
 
The study shows that there is a negative relationship between NED and firm performance in 
terms of ROA, and positive in terms of Tobin’s Q but still statistically insignificant 
relationship of NED and firm performance. Additionally, NEDs might not be independent 
enough to perform their job and effectively monitor or they are unable to interfere in 
management decision because of close relationships with managers sometimes. In line with 
stewardship theory, NEDs are less capable of monitoring the mangers than inside directors 
because of their lack of specialist knowledge about firm’s internal operations. 
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When the number of board committees increase, ROA also increases while the Tobin’s Q 
decreases. Number of committee members is an important variable for corporate governance, 
so if it increases that means there is an increase in better supervision of decision, disclosure 
of information and better protection of rights. Overall it proves the quality of better corporate 
governance and has a positive impact on firm performance. However these relationships are 
not significant for ROA and Tobin’s Q. When we compare the finding with past studies, there 
are some of the findings that support the presence of different board committees for 
increasing firm performance. McMullen (1996) found that increasing the number of board 
committees ensures that the firms have powerful internal audit which results in less stressed 
financials. Klein (1998) also found a positive relationship between board committees and 
firm performance though it is not significant. The reason for this insignificance may be that 
the committee members are not independent enough and firms should give importance to 
their independence level. According to Lam et al. (2012), the efficiency of the board 
committees depends on the independence of the board composition.  
 
Results show that there is a positive relationship between number of board meetings and firm 
performance and it has also significantly affects both ROA and Tobin’s Q. Frequency of 
board meetings is positive but insignificant on both performance measures. The result is 
consistent with Vefeas (1999) who reported a negative relationship between frequency of 
board meeting and financial performance using Tobin’s Q as a performance proxy. 
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The sample of this study shows that women directors on the board have positive but 
insignificant relationship with both ROA and Tobin’s Q. 
 
According to the results SSB size has a positive but insignificant association with ROA while 
it shows a negative and significant relationship with Tobin’s Q. According to the findings of 
ROA, the size of SSB enhances the firm performance but the result from Tobin’s Q shows 
that the smaller the SSB size the better the firm performance. 
 
Firm size is negative and significant according to ROA, suggesting that smaller companies in 
the sample are the ones who are performing best. The findings of Tobin’s Q show a negative 
and insignificant relationship between firm size and firm performance. 
 
Result from this study shows that leverage reports a negative and highly insignificant impact 
on financial performance (ROA): higher levels of debt will decrease firm performance. In 
other words, the findings indicate that the higher the debt ratio, the lower the ROA. The 
reason for higher level of debt ratio in firms might be the increase in cost of operations 
(Dechow et al. 1996). Higher debt ratio may result in firm’s inability to raise new credit and 
also the reason for losing valuable investment opportunities. This also refers to the negative 
impact of higher debt ratio on the amount of dividends paid. In addition, higher leverage 
shows financial distress. 
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5.4 Summary 
 
This chapter discussed the empirical findings regarding the impact of corporate governance 
mechanisms, particularly the impact of SSB on firm performance. The chapter specifically 
presented the discussion and the findings of the descriptive analysis undertaken in this study, 
and dealt with the main inferences drawn from the multiple regressions. The tables are 
presented separately according to the research objectives in order to ensure that the 
discussion and the presentation of the findings are straightforward. 
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Chapter 6: Summary and Conclusion 
 
6.0 Introduction 
 
This concluding chapter is organised as follows. Section 6.1 provides the summary of the 
analysis performed. Next section 6.2 discusses the conclusion. Section 6.3 discusses the 
limitations of the research, and the last section 6.4 recommends avenues for future research. 
 
6.1 Summary 
 
The review of different corporate governance theories refers to the importance of board of 
directors as an essential part of internal governance that monitor the management to achieve 
the business objectives successfully and also enhance the companies’ performance. The aim 
of this study was to determine the relationship between corporate governance mechanisms 
and firm performance and in particular the impact of SSB on the firm performance. This was 
achieved through defining the governance variables and two performance measures 
(dependent variables). 
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This section summarises the results, in context of the research questions initially set out. 
 
Research question 1 
 
Is there any relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and the Malaysian 
financial institutions’ performance? 
 
This study found some evidence to suggest that there is a relationship between corporate 
governance mechanisms and the Malaysian financial institutions’ performance. Very 
interestingly, the evidence suggests a positive effect on firm’s performance. More 
specifically, it is found that the frequency of board meetings, the proportion of women 
directors in the board and the number of committees on the board are positively related with 
firm’s performance. This is sensible because those factors signify improved corporate 
governance practice. The benefit of improved governance can be in the form of possible 
reductions in the firms’ cost of capital that subsequently improves their firm’s value. A 
positive relationship between the board size and ROA supports the view that Malaysian 
financial institutions with larger boards may provide for more efficient monitoring of the 
current activities of the firm.   
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Research Question 2 
 
Is there any similarity and difference between the performance of firms’ with SSB and firms’ 
without SSB? 
 
This study found differences between the performance of firms with and without SSB. To 
certain extent, there is some evidence to suggest that firms without SSB perform better. This 
is particularly interesting in the case of Malaysian financial institutions because there are 
some Islamic financial institutions that do not have a SSB or a Shariah advisor. Despite   SSB 
is commonly regarded as a compulsory structural component and legitimate body of authority 
for an Islamic financial institution, its effect on the overall institutional performance is rather 
far from being prevalent. 
 
Research Question 3 
 
Is there any reason behind the absence of SSB in Islamic financial institutions despite of the 
requirement? 
 
There are some reasons behind the absence of SSB in the Malaysian Islamic financial 
institutions even though it is a requirement for them. SSB in Islamic financial institutions are 
not much powerful and well-equipped to regulate operations of individual institutions. 
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Indispensably however, such a regulatory body could have been armed with some powers of 
exercising punitive measures within the meaning of executive functionality. 
 
In the Islamic financial institutions, Shariah scholars or experts certify what is permissible 
and ensure the firm’s activities work in compliance with Shariah. However, there is evidence 
of shortage of Shariah scholars where there are scholars working in more than one firm. This 
affects the firm’s performance negatively as well as raises a question on transparency and 
accountability of the scholars.  In the present governance structure of Malaysian financial 
institutions, this study found that SSB is not contributing adequately.  
 
6.2 Conclusion 
 
The results of this study report that good corporate governance is an important factor in 
determining firm performance. Many inferior performance and business failures are due to 
the board’s inability to address the overall company performance in an effective manner. The 
reason is in the structure of the board, particularly in relation to the structure of the decision 
making process which needs to be reformed to focus on sustaining high performance in the 
face of a rapidly changing environment (Cutting & Kouzmin 2000). Therefore, governance 
structures must be designed to improve the quality of monitoring of board decisions (Laing & 
Weir 1999). It can also be argued that firms which have implemented effective governance 
practices consisting of the board structures recommended in the code of best practice in 
Malaysia are likely to adopt strategies that will result in long-term sustainability of the firms. 
This study examined corporate governance variables which are board size, non-executive 
director, women director, board meetings, board committees, SSB size and investigated the 
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effect of these variables on firm performance, while controlling for firm’s size and age 
factors. Building upon corporate governance theories of agency and stewardship, it can be 
concluded that board’s monitoring is pertinent in achieving positive performance while the 
SSB’s stewardship role does not contribute to firm’s performance.        
 
6.3 Limitations of the Study 
 
This study has some limitations. First, the data collection was limited to publicly available 
data sources such as annual reports and other databases. If there are problems relating to data 
disclosures or professional accounting practices, then that would limit the validity of the 
findings. The use of secondary data for this study also limits the opportunity to gather some 
specific information needed to analyse other dimensions such as the qualitative 
characteristics of the shareholders, board and SSB members.  
Second, the entire population comprises of only 43 Malaysian financial institutions, which is 
relatively smaller sample. The size of the sample is limited by number of firms listed on the 
Malaysian stock exchange in year 2012-2016.  
Only secondary data used for this study, limited the chances to gather some specific 
information needed to analyse certain information such as, shareholders, board members and 
SSB members. Third, this study is strictly quantitative and based on only one stock market. 
The financial performance indicators are also limited to ROA and firm’s market value as 
measured by Tobin’s Q. 
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6.4 Suggestion for Further Research 
 
This study makes a considerable contribution to the understanding of corporate governance 
practice in Malaysia and its role in influencing the firm’s performance. While this study 
focuses on listed companies in the BNM and MYX, it is also important to understand the 
corporate governance practice in the non-listed companies of Malaysia. The future research 
could be in the form of a comparative assessment of corporate governance practices between 
listed and non-listed companies in Malaysia. This will offer an avenue to examine whether 
the practices are affected in a similar fashion or otherwise.  
 
This study was undertaken from 2012 to 2016, so future research could examine corporate 
governance practices and firm performance by exploring a longer period to provide an in-
depth understanding of the relationship between corporate governance practices and firm 
performance. Moreover, it is also recommended that future studies investigate more 
governance mechanisms to test their relationship with firm’s performance.  
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Appendix 
 
Table 7: List of Financial Institutions used in this research 
No Name of Financial Institutions Sector 
1 Amanah Harta REIT 
2 Al-Aqar REIT 
3 AmFirst REIT 
4 Amanahraya REIT 
5 Atrium REIT 
6 Axis REIT 
7 Capitaland REIT 
8 Hektar REIT 
9 IGB  REIT 
10 KLCC PROPERTY HOLDINGS 
BERHAD 
REIT 
11 MRCB-Quill REIT 
12 Pavilion REIT 
13 Sunway REIT 
14 Tower REIT 
15 UOA REIT 
16 YTL REIT 
17 AEON FINANCE 
18 Affin FINANCE 
19 AMMB FINANCE 
20 Apex FINANCE 
21 BIMB FINANCE 
22 Bursa FINANCE 
23 CIMB FINANCE 
24 ECM Libra FINANCE 
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25 ELK Desa FINANCE 
26 Hong Leong Bank FINANCE 
27 Insas FINANCE 
28 Johan FINANCE 
29 LPI Capital FINANCE 
30 MAA FINANCE 
31 Manulife FINANCE 
32 Malayan Banking FINANCE 
33 M Building Society FINANCE 
34 MNRB FINANCE 
35 MPHB Capital FINANCE 
36 OSK FINANCE 
37 P&O FINANCE 
38 PB Bank FINANCE 
39 RCE Capital FINANCE 
40 RHB Bank FINANCE 
41 TA Enterprise FINANCE 
42 Syarikat Takaful FINANCE 
43 Tune Project FINANCE 
 
 
 
